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Abstract:

This paper assesses the corporate strength of Chinese firms in the global
market and addresses the question: does China's growing corporate
strength indicate a rise in its global influence, or, in other words, what are
the prospects for the emergence of capitalism with Chinese characteristics
as the new dominant paradigm. It finds that Chinese corporations have
significantly improved their global profit share in several sectors during
2007-2013. Many of these corporations are Chinese state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) that play a dominant role. Summarizing a recent case
study of Chinese SOE strategy in the Zambian copper belt it provides
evidence for close interaction between the state and corporate
management which is dependent on state and party support. SOE
management also partially shares the ideological perspective of the state
elite. The state can use this SOE corporate strategy as an instrument for
the pursuit of Chinese national interests but its ability to do is constrained
by the bargaining capability of other states. However, China does not
intend to play the type of adversarial role that the USSR did during the
Cold War era. China's challenge to the West is nationalistic and not
ideological and is therefore unlikely to stimulate distributional reform in
the West.
Keywords: corporate strategy, dominance, mining, SOE, state support, China
In a path-breaking book Epistemologies of the South, the Portuguese intellectual
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) studies the impact of the expected geopolitical shift of
global capitalist power. Thomas Pikety (2014) also predicts such a shift based on his forecast
of changes in the ratio of private capital to national income in Europe, America and Asia
during the twenty first century'. Estimates and expectations of this shift are usually
intertwined with explanations of persistent slowdown of growth in the West following the
American subprime mortgage crisis of 20082 and declining growth has been identified as a
cause of rising inequality within and between countries ' (Streeck 2014).
Cyclical downturns are of course almost a routine in capitalist history. Overcoming
these crises has normally involved the imposition of restrictions on capital accumulation to
take account of social needs not served by the market. A striking feature of the post 2008
period is the absence of a new policy paradigm akin to Keynesianism (which was a response
to the Great Depression), and Neoclassicism (which became dominant due to the increased
labor militancy of the late nineteenth century). The institutional and regulatory regime
reforms that have occurred at the national and global level during 2009-2014 are modest (EIS
, Piketty's predictions are for the period 1870-2090.
Declining growth among the advanced countries is a ling term trend. Thus, annual growth
rates (calculated ont teh basis of the year among averages) in the OECD economies have
declined from 4 percent in 1972 to about zero in 2010 (OECD).
3 During 1983-2010 the average value of the Gini Coefficient has risen by ten percent among
the OECD economies (OECD Income Distribution Data Base).
2
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2013). While production growth remains anemic in the metropolitan economies the financial
sector has achieved a remarkable recovery in terms of profits, capital gains, dividend and
salaries and bonuses of top management. For the last four decades, governments, households
and the financial and non-financial corporate sector have continued to pile up debt in the
OECD economies. While interest rates remain near zero austerity macro policies target the
poor throughout the Western world. The political influence of the corporate sector on the
national political system in the Western democracies has not weakened. Since the early 1990s
the average tax to GDP has declined in the OECD economies and tax systems have become
increasingly regressive as top marginal income and corporate tax rates have often declined
(OECD Tax Statistics Database).
The "rich man's Keynesianism"_ trillion dollar bailouts, Quantitative Easing (QE I
not fueled mass revolt in
any major metropolitan economy. As Colin Crouch has argued the "democratic class
struggle" has now morphed into "politainment" (Crouch 2004) characterized by media social
dominance, mass political disillusionment, declining electoral turnouts and electoral
fragmentation" (Gardels 2010).

& II), near negative interest rates, mildly regressive taxation_has

Within advanced capitalist economies there exist no collective agents for contesting
accelerated capital accumulation for promoting system integration (Lockwood 1964). The
protests that do occur_ related to the World Social Movement, Occupy Wall Street etc._
are local, easily dispersed5'uncoordinated and quite incapable of politically articulating a new
vision of capitalist order. Nor capitalist values_ trust, faith, familial and class solidarity,
altruism_essential for sustaining capitalist order are being undermined in all metropolitan
societies.
Opposition to liberal capitalist order has also been external and rivalry for system
hegemony between the Soviet Union and the United States and the arms race it generated
played no small part in sustaining growth in the West during the Cold War era (which at least
until the early 1970s coincided with capitalism's "golden age"). Today, America's systemic
hegemony can be contested by China, rising militarily, economically and socially. Even
Samuel Huntington recognized that the cultural distinctiveness of China and China's political
system has not, at least so far, been seriously dented by attempted liberal insurgencies
(Tiananmen 1989, Hong Kong 2014). Can China replace the Soviet Union as the adversarial
external force which induces metropolitan liberal capitalism to implement systemic reforms
necessary for correcting the imbalances generated by the "overdevelopment" of global
financial markets?
The depoliticization
of the public enterprise sector (both manufacturing and
financial) and a reduction of its influence on "the commanding heights" of the economy seem
unlikely since the Party rules the market at least partially through the SOEs. Accepting
subservience to global capital markets is tantamount to a significant dilution of the Party's
control over the Chinese political economy. An incipient inter-capitalist rivalry between
Chinese state capital and global capital therefore cannot be ruled out". Moreover, even the
domestic private sector was not an enthusiastic supporter of China's WTO membership and

Moreover, a key aspect of "post democratic" regimes is the increased autonomy of the
central banks (subject to less and less control by political authorities) and the acceptance of
surveillance by international agencies such as the IMF, the WTO, global rating and standard
rating agencies (Meenai & Ansari 2010).
5 They are not anti-capitalist movements because they endorse the essential capitalist values:
freedom, equality and progress (Ansari 2014).
6 Hodgson argues "every socio-economic system must rely on at least one structurally
dissimilar subsystem to function (2001: 7 fu).
4
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has often favored increased protectionist measures (Huang 2008: 75-77) and private export
oriented Chinese firms have always been determined opponents of revaluation of the Chinese
currency.
What follows is an assessment of the relative weight of the Chinese corporate sector in
the global economy followed by an identification of similarities and differences in the
corporate strategy of Chinese SOEs and metropolitan global firms. This will permit some
reflection on the question: does the Chinese corporate model represent an alternative to
mainstream corporate strategy so that "capitalism with Chinese characteristics" can emerge as
the new dominant paradigm capable of challenging the systemic dominance of the
metropolitan liberal democracies.
China's Weight in the Corporate

World

It has now become conventional wisdom to predict an inexorable shift of global economic
power from the West to the East. China's century is at hand (Beckley 2011). These
predictions are based on the presumption that national power is adequately measured by
national accounts_ national shares of global GNP, investment, manufacturing value added
balances of trade etc. But today a substantial proportion of economic activity within a country
is directed and controlled by global capital. Therefore national economic power cannot be
equated with GNP and its product or expenditure components despite the fact that militaries
and parliaments still remain national. This consideration is particularly important in the case
of China whose growth has been export driven and where foreign firms control a significant
proportion of investment in the "cutting edge" high technology industries. Ninety percent of
what Chinese customs classifies as high technology exports is produced by foreign owned
companies (Beckley 20 II: 43) and although since 2009 China has become the world's largest
exporter of electronics, the share of Chinese owned firms in global electronics market in 2013
was only 1.6 percent (see Table 1). In today's globalizing world estimates of the distribution
of economic power must take account of the distribution of the global corporate earnings.
Table 1 presents China's national profit shares of the world's top 2000 corporations in
25 sectors in 2007 and 2013.
Table 1: China's Profit Share and Rank Among Forbes' Top 2000 Publicly Traded
Companies in 2007 and 2013
Sector

2013

2007
Share

Rank

Share

Rank

0

0

0

0

I.

Aerospace/defense

2.

Automobiles

0.6

9

5

5

3.

Banking

4.3

6

32

1

4.

Business/services

0

0

0

0

5.

Hotels, restaurants

0

0

3

7

6.

Chemicals

0

0

0.5

21

7.

Computer hardware & software

0.02

14

2

4

8.

Conglomerates

0

0

0

0

9. Construction
10. Electronics
II. Financial services
12. Food manufacturing

0.6
0
0.02
0.3

19
0
25
20

28
3
2
5.3

1
6
6
6
7
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Forest ,metals & mini ng
Health care
Heavy machinery
Insurance
Media
Oil & Gas
Pharmaceuticals
Real estate
Retail
Telecommunication
Trading companies
Transportation
Utilities

5.5
0
l.6
l.2
0
6.3
0
0
0
3.3
0.4
5.1
1.1

8
0
8
10
0
5
0
0
0
9
5
7
15

20
0
11
7
0
7
0
19
l.6
3
2.1
8
4.5

2015
1
0
4
5
0
3
0
2
10
8
4
3
9

Source: Starrs, S. (2014: 84-85). Calculated from Scott De Carlo (ed.) Forbes Global 2000,
forbes. com, 2007; 2010; 2013.
During the 2007-2013 pe riod the rise of Chinese corporations in the global economy
has been spectacular. Their aver age profit share of the 25 sectors reported in Table 1
quintupled. In banking, constructio n, and mining & metals, Chinese owned firms ranked first
among the 391 firms (of the For bes top 2000) including in these sectors in 20137. In the
automobiles, electronics, financia I services, food manufacturing, computer hardware and
software, insurance, oil and gas, real estate, trading companies and transportation sectors
Chinese firms also had market lea ding positions in 20138. Chinese owned companies can thus
be seen in a market leading posit ion in 13 sectors. However, their profit share exceeds 20
percent in only three sectors in 20 13_ banking, construction and mining & metals in each of
which the top ranked Forbes 2000 firm was Chinese. Their share of profit approximated 19
percent in the real estate sector in which the Chinese owned firm ranked second among 119
Forbes 2000 firms included in thi s sector. The only other sectors with a significant Chinese
profit share in 2013 were heavy m achinery 11 percent", transportation 8 percent'°, oil and gas,
and insurance 7 percent each.
Thus, despite the progres s that Chinese corporations have made in recent years their
global market dominance remain s limited. Chinese corporations' share of Forbes 2000
company profits increased in 18 0ut of the 25 sectors recorded in Table 1 during 2007-2013
but its average share of sectoral Fo rbes 2000 corporation profits in 2013 was still only about 6
percent. China currently does no t seriously challenge America's dominance of the global
corporate market I I. According to the Forbes data American corporations ranked first in
Number of top 2000 Forbes firm s included in banking were 267, in construction 76, and in
mining and metals 93 (Starrs 2014 : 84).
8 In automobiles
Chinese firms r anked fifth out of 54 Forbes 2000 firms included in this
sector, in electronics sixth out of 49, in fmancial services fifth out of 93, in food
manufacturing sixth out of 86, in computer hardware and software fourth out of 72, in
insurance sixth out of99, in oil an d gas third out of 113, in trading companies fourth out of 17
and in transportation third out of 6 l.
7

Chinese firm ranking fourth out 0 f 64 Forbes 2000 firms.
In 2013 ranks of Chinese fiirms were as follows: oil and gas fourth out of 115,
transportation third out of 62, insur ance sixth out of 99.
II Data on American corporations
share of Forbes global 2000 for 2007 and 2013 are taken
from De Carlo (2007, 2013).
8
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eighteen of the twenty five sectors in 2013. Their market share increased during 2007~2013 in
five sectors_ business services, hotels, computer hardware and software, financial services,
and media. In aerospace and defense, food manufacturing, heavy machinery, retail business
the market share of America's leading business corporations increased as against that of its
nearest competitor corporation" during 2007-2013. In conglomerates, health care services,
heavy machinery, oil and gas and transportation there has been notable recovery since 2010.
If we defme 40 percent as the profit share proportion that signals market dominance than in
2013 American corporations dominated the market in aerospace and defense, computer
hardware and software, health care, financial services, media, pharmaceuticals, and retail
business. As against this, Chinese corporations did not cross the 40 percent threshold in any
sector in 2013.
However, the Forbes data shows that Chinese corporations ranked among the top
five in twelve sectors in 2013: automobiles, banking, computer hardware and software,
construction, metal and mining, heavy machinery, insurance, oil and gas, real estate,
telecommunications 13,trading companies, and transportation. But despite the global rise of
Chinese owned firms _ a large proportion of which remains state owned_they
have what
can only be described as a "dependent relationship" with foreign owned firms in most sectors.
Thus, in 2011 China became the world's largest PC market yet Chinese corporations' share of
Forbes global 2000 corporations in this sector was just 2 percent (Table 1) in 201314. Despite
being the world's biggest exporter of electronics since 2004 the sectoral share of Chinese
owned corporations in 2013 was only 3 percent (Table 1). Even in the domestic market global
(especially American) firms dominate. In 2011 Pepsi and Coke accounted for 87 percent of
Chinese soft drink sales. Google increased the Chinese national smart phone market share
from 0.6 percent in 2009 to 87 percent in 2012. Beijing supplied more than half of China's
commercial airline fleet (Rappeport 2011; Hille 2013; Rabinovitch 2011; Woke 2011)15.
Many of China's leading firms are assemblers with little control over the global supply chain
or branding, marketing, innovations, product design and R & D. Hence their share of global
profit is small". Moreover, in 20 10 more than three quarters of China's leading 200 exporters
were foreign owned corporations (Xinhua 2010). Further, the corporations in China_ both
foreign and national do not spend much on the development of cutting edge technologies and
product innovation. Thus, China's share of R & D spending by the world's top 1500
corporations in 2011 was only 2.2 percent well below the United States (34.8 percent), Japan
(28.3 percent), Germany (10 percent), France (5 percent) U.K (4.4 percent) Switzerland (4.3
percent) and South Korea (2.9 percent) (EU 2012: 39). Chinese corporations have made
remarkable progress over the past decade but they are nowhere near challenging the global
dominance of the U.S, Japanese and German corporations. In technologically advanced
sectors_
computer hardware,
electronics,. aerospace
and defence, conglomerates,
12 Suppose American corporation's
share of global profits falls from 20 percent to 15 percent
but of that of its nearest competitor falls from 5 percent to 1 percent. Then, the American
corporation's profit share in proportion to that of its nearest competitor would rise from 400
percent to 1500 percent despite a 5 percent fall in the American corporation's share of
sectoral profit.
13With the China Mobile listed in Hong Kong but headquartered in Beijing.
14The corresponding share of American corporations in this sector in 2013 was 72 percent
(De Carlo 2013).
15See also Steinfeld (2010).
II> Thus, the Asian Development
Bank has estimated that Hon Hi's_ China's largest private
sector employer and the world's largest electronics contractor_
share of Apple iPhone 3's
cost was only about 9 percent in 2010 and its share of profit generated by iPhone 3 for Apple,
of course, was much lower (Xing & Detert 2010: 2).
9
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In present day capitalism dominance remains the exercise of national power_for
while markets are global, states and armies remain national. The Chinese state may
legitimately be seen as dominant over its corporate sector. Chinese private sector leaders
remain closely connected to the Chinese Communist Party at district and provincial levels of
the state administration. Moreover, the public sector plays an exceptionally large role in the
national economy_particularly
in sectors in which Chinese corporations predominate in
global markets_banking,
construction, metals and mining and heavy machinery. State
control over the national financial system is crucial for maintaining its corporate
dominance_
for subsided loans and other financial privileges bolster the profits of both
public and private corporations 17. China's capitalism has been described as "state led"
(Walter & Howe 2011) with state owned enterprises (SOEs) playing a significant role in close
cooperation with the Communist Party. Major public firms have been floated in overseas
stock markets. SOEs have long enjoyed privileged access to the fmancial sector which
remains under the grip of the Party. Heads of the .largest SOEs are equal in rank to provincial
governors; many are members or alternative members of the Party's Central Committee
(Walter & Howe 2011).
The question therefore is: can the Chinese state use its sectorally predominant
corporations as instrument to challenge the U.S or EU dominance? Is Chinese public
investment in particular articulating a corporate strategy fundamentally different from that of
leading Western multinationals? Investigation into these questions will help us understand the
degree of global influence of China's growing corporate strength.
Corporate Strategy of Chinese Public Sector Multinationals:

A Case Study

Partial answers to these questions have been provided by Chang (2014) in a detailed
ethnographic case study of the Zambian subsidiary (NFCA) of the Chinese state-owned China
Nonferrous Metal Mining Company (CNMC)_ China's leading multinational in the
nonferrous metal sector". Nonferrous Company Africa (NFCA) is a subsidiary of CNMC.
This study compares the capital accumulation strategy, the labor regime and the management
ethos of NFCA with that of the other multinational subsidiaries operating in the Zambian
copper belt. The key question that we seek to address is: does CNMC's Zambian subsidiary
serve China's national interests as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? One of
the objectives is to secure access to key natural resources which are seen to be in short supply
in China'". CNMC's Zambian subsidiary purchased the Chambishi mine_ abandoned for
several years and producing very low grade copper with this explicit objective in view".
Another major investment objective has been to promote China's diplomatic posture in
Zambia. CNMC's Zambian investment was driven by the motive to counter Taiwanese
initiatives on the one hand and on the other to secure African support for China's U.N
Security Council's membership.
CNMC's response to the 2008 collapse of Zambian copper export prices also reflects
a concern to secure Zambian political support. In autumn 2008 copper prices fell from a high
of $9,000 per ton to $2,000 per ton. All major multinationals in Zambia _ except CNMC_

17 In 2008-2009 China's bank and financial sector bailout package was second only to that of
the U.S.A (Lardy 2012).
18 With operations in 20 countries in 2011.
19 In 2012 these included oil, copper, aluminum and iron (among others).
20 All facts and quotations_unless
otherwise sources_in
this section are taken from Lee
(2014: 29-60).
10
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announced job cuts". In the midst of this crisis NFCA adopted the "Three NOs" policy
no
job cuts, no salary cuts, no reduction in output. CNMC demonstrated its willingness to accept
short term financial losses to secure long term resource security and political influence. The
crisis was seen as an opportunity to enhance China's image in Africa.
CNMC's response to the Zambian government's decision to impose windfall profit
tax on copper mines in early 2008 was also in sharp contrast to that of other multinationals
which refused to pay this tax and mounted a global campaign against it. CNMC paid this tax
and voiced its support for government policy. CNMC also voiced support for a doubling
royalty taxes in 2011 whereas all other multinationals protested vociferously.
CNMC also enthusiastically
supported the Zambian government's
decision to
establish a Special Economic Zone occupying over a third of its mining concession area22. A
principal concern of the Zambian government, through the establishment of this SEZ is to
promote copper manufacturing in Zambia. Other multinationals
and the World Bank
have vigorously opposed copper based manufacturing regarding itas uneconomic in Zambia
(World Bank and USAID 2011).
Despite these differences in corporate strategies of Chinese SOEs and other
multinatlonals'" some striking similarities should also be noted. CNMC senior officials
emphasize that they are expected to make a profit though not maxim ize it (Lee 2014: 36).
Moreover, the organization of the work process in Chinese multinationals is usually judged to
be more exploitative than that of other multinationals. In 2001 Michael Sata, leader of the
Zambian Patriotic Front charged Chinese corporations of "imposing slavery from Cape Town
to Cairo" (Lee 2014: 33).
The labor process in Zambian copper mining is the same irrespective of corporate
ownership. Senior management positions are almost exclusively reserved for Chinese
expatriates in NFCA and a "glass ceiling" is firmly in place in Chinese as in other
multinationals_ however there is little truth in the widespread rumor that China imports its
manual workforce to Africa". On the other hand, CNMC's subsidiary's strategy is not
competitive. It had only one mining subcontractor and that from China during 2003-12.
CNMC pays significantly lower wages than other mining multinationals in Zambia
and safety provisions at its work stations are poorer, but job contracts are firmer and staff
turnover rates much lower. Management yields to union pressure only under threat of wildcat
strikes or government intervention. Deadlocked negotiations with African labor are routine.
Working conditions are also harsher for Chinese junior and senior management
personnel than for other multinational executives. Chinese management is resigned to what
they call "eating bitterness". This reflects both a commitment to consensual national
ideologically sanctioned values and an acceptance of state and Party discipline as necessary
for survival. The Chinese SOE sector management ethos is quite distinct from that of typical
multinational executives. A communitarian identity is nurtured in Chinese corporate culture.
Deadlocked negotiations with labor reflect Chinese management's incomprehension of the
Zambia's unwillingness "to eat bitterness"_
regarded by Chinese managers as necessary for
Zambia's development.
Thirty percent of the total Zambian mining workforce is estimated to have lost jobs in
2008-2009 (Matenga 2010).
22 Known as the Zambia-China
Cooperating Zone (ZCCZ) constructed by a CNMC
subsidiary which is also responsible for attracting investors to it.
23 For example, reflected in CNMC's three NOs in response to the 2008 crises.
24 Chinese expatriates to Africa have been described as "prison labor sent by Beijing". See
Hairong & Sautman (2012).
11
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Communitarian and nationalistic individuation is buttressed by the strict discipline of
communal living in specially established "China Houses" throughout Africa where Chinese
expatriates usually reside". Communal living is accepted as a necessary price to pay for
ensuring safety". Chinese SOE managers in Zambia's copper belt resent criticism of Chinese
human rights record and regard their country to be the victim of imperialist propaganda.
Ties between SOE management and the state and CCP officials are also strengthened
by China's concessional assistance strategy. The Zambian construction industry for example
is a major recipient of Chinese concessional loans". Chinese concessional loans are
conditional in that they stipulate sourcing from China and preclude open bidding. Chinese
SOE construction companies have strong links with China's EXIM Bank and are involved in
negotiating construction
project investment cost. Thus, concessional
assistance and
subsidized credit policies are used by the state to influence Chinese SOE corporate strategy.
SOEs as Instruments

of China's

Global Dominance

As we have seen, in recent years Chinese corporations have made remarkable
progress in several sectors. As Table 1 shows in banking, construction and metals and mining
they have the largest sectoral profit share. In the automobiles, computer hardware and
software, heavy machinery, oil and gas, real estate and transportation sectors Chinese
corporations were ranked among the top five in 2013_ and in all these sectors SOEs play an
important role. When the 2007 ranking is compared with that of2013, Chinese corporations
are seen to have improved their ranking in 19 out of the 25 sectors recorded in Table 1.
Can China use its growing corporate power in several sectors to promote its national
interests and challenge U.S hegemony? The SOEs are the principal market instrument the
CCP and the Chinese state can use for this purpose. State elite support for SOEs remains as
strong as ever_illustrated
by the trillion dollar bailout and support packages extended to
SOEs in banking, construction, mineral and heavy machinery sectors by the government in
the wake of the 2008 crisis. The CCP is committed to a shift in economic strategy from
prioritizing investment to promoting consumption growth and from export to domestic market
orientation; but this does not imply a necessary decline in SOEs salience since SOEs produce
mainly for the domestic market and not for exports". A major phase out of SOEs presence in
the "commanding heights" sectors of the economy is tantamount to a CCP acceptance of a
major decline in its political control over society. This, to put it euphemistically, seems
somewhat unlikely under Xi's leadership. The Zambian case study shows that SOEs
corporate leadership articulates a corporate strategy which takes account of national interests
as defmed by the CCP not under duress but because it_ at least partially_shares
the
ideological perspectives of the political 'elite. It is resigned to "eating bitterness" which it
regards as necessary for national development and accepts the view that China is a victim of
imperialist propaganda, intentionally misrepresented by the global media. The typical SOEs
manager has a communitarian identity and is influenced by nationalist ideology. This makes
himlher willing participant in the strategy to promote Chinese national interests through
corporate strategy.
With breakfast at 6 am, lunch at noon, dinner at 6 pm and (sometimes) a curfew at 8 pm.
Accepting harsh living conditions and CCP discipline partly reflects a growing sense of
fear and insecurity among Chinese managers. CCP officials at the CNMC mine were fearful
also of popular criticism of China. Both managers and CCP officials see China as a victim of
media propaganda.
27 This exceeds the sectoral concessionalloans
received by Zambia from the World Bank and
African Development Bank during 2000-2013 (Lee 2014: 41).
28 Thus, while share of global sectoral profits of Chinese SOEs may be expected to fall over
the next decade their share of assets and sales may not decline.
12
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But this does not mean that China is committed to undermining the global capitalist
order. There is no evidence for this at all. Nor is it the case that China can always get what it
wants through investing even in poor developing countries. Thus, as Corkin (2013) shows
Angola successfully negotiated the pricing of its oil shipments, equity fmancing arrangements
and promoting local content sourcing in concessional credit lines in its dealings with China.
Patey (2014) documents similar success of the Sudanese government in negotiating oil sector
joint ventures agreement with China's SOEs.
Conclusion:
We conclude therefore that the SOEs can serve as an instrument for the promotion of
national interests by the Chinese state and the CCP, and there is limited ideological affmity
between the state elite and SOEs sector corporate management. However, China does not
always choose to use SOEs to pursue national political priorities and its capacity to do so is
often restructured by the bargaining capacity of other states even in the Third world.
However, Chinese national interests are distinct
sometimes conflictual, sometimes
convergent_ from that of the current global system hegemon, the U.S.A. The Chinese SOEs
will continue to be used by the CCP to challenge America's dominance, but only in areas
where Chinese national interests are seen by the CCP as conflictual with the U.S. This means
that at least for the foreseeable future china is unlikely to play the type of adversarial role that
the Soviet Union did in the Cold War era. Leftist political movements in the West are not
inspired by the present day China, as some of them were by the Bolshevik and the Maoist
regimes because income and wealth inequalities are high and rising in China. The Chinese
challenge_such as it is_is unlikely to induce Western political elites to implement reforms
for correcting distributional imbalances in their countries. China has no intention to foment
revolutionary class struggle anywhere in the world'". The Chinese challenge_
like that of
nineteenth century Germany and Japan to the then capitalist system hegemon, Britain_ is
nationalistic, not ideological. Capitalism with Chinese characteristics is not for export even to
Hong Kong and Macau. II
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